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INTRODUCTION
Some intangibles can be owned. Some cannot. Decisions about
the scope of protection are usually described as the outcomes of
economics, special interest politics, or history. Economic relation-
ships, special interest groups, and political power, however, have
long been dominated by men. Furthermore, economic efficiency
through individual ownership is an inherently male approach to the
world, especially when the central prong of ownership is the right
to exclude others.
The history of intellectual property is a history of expansion:
expansion of both the subjects protectable and the rights given
individuals over their property. Nevertheless, a few res are not yet
protected, at least in the United States. In copyright, the most
prominent are clothing, food, and folklore. In patent, the most
prominent are one's own body and traditional knowledge. Also
unprotected is the general right to share in what shapes the
community, the public domain. This article argues that all of these
exclusions are gendered in an anti-feminist manner.
One might argue, however, that modern changes to the United
States copyright regime are pro-feminist. The Copyright Revision
Act of 1976 moved the general line of protection from the point of
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publication to the point of fixation.' In combination with the Berne
Implementation Act,2 it eliminated most of the prior need for copy-
right formalities. These changes eased individual access to federal
copyright protection, including access by women. This increased
ease of protection, however, detracts from the feminization of the
legal world by undermining the public domain.
The seeming contradictions in this introduction rest on the
multiple dimensions of the terms 'gendered' and 'anti-feminist.'
Participants in a struggle for betterment commonly differ not only
on how to theorize their struggle, but also on whether to focus on
the short term goal of improving living conditions or on the long
term goal of changing basic social structure. If the long term goal is
impossible, following it wastes the possibilities for improvement. If
the short term goal is chosen, however, the underclass obtains a
stake in the status quo, thus undercutting, perhaps fatally, any
possibility of deep change. "Assimilation in an unworthy society is
an unworthy goal. ' This article does not assert that all women are
interchangeable or live some universalizable 'female' life. Any middle-
class feminist should openly acknowledge that more disadvantaged
women face much more pressure to prioritize immediate goals.4
In the intellectual property wars, however, all so-called con-
sumers5 (and many producers) have a stake in the endangered
public domain. Women are not alone.6 Therefore, the goal of deep
1. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2544 (1976) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
3. MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER 474 (1985).
4. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1915-17
(1987) (discussing the pros and cons of allowing women to choose to be sex workers).
5. "In conditions of postmodernity, cultural consumption is increasingly understood
as an active use rather than a passive dependence .. " ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 104 (1998). The Internet, furthermore, has
notoriously empowered consumers as editors, publishers, and authors. See, e.g., Yochai
Benkler, Abstract, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, http://www.
benkler.org/CoasesPenguin.html (last visited Mar. 8,2006) (abstract of the article Yochai
Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002)) (noting that the Internet allows "commons-based peer-production," in which
"groups of individuals successfully collaborate on large-scale projects following a diverse
cluster of motivational drives and social signals, rather than either market prices or
managerial commands").
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 8 (2004) (objecting to changes in law
which have made the United States "less and less a free culture, more and more a
permission culture"); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 33, 39 (2003)
(complaining that "the commons of facts and ideas is being enclosed").
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change is sufficiently realistic to warrant choices to forego short
term benefits.
This article discusses each of these claims in relation to the type
of feminism affronted by its non-protection. Liberal feminism under-
lies the complaint about the exclusion of clothing and food from
copyright protection. Essentialist feminism objects to providing
patent protection to medical researchers for inventions derived from
patients' body parts, but not recognizing the contributions of the
patients. Communitarian versions of feminism object to the
requirement of identifiable individual authors or inventors, which
makes folklore unprotectable by copyright and traditional knowl-
edge unprotectable by patent. Feminism's most utopian form,
humanist feminism (which includes strains of socialist, radical, and
Marxist feminism), supports protection and expansion of the public
domain.
This article's core claim is that the public domain is inherently
feminist, especially for those who recognize that "both women and
men are oppressed by the 'sex role system"' of western capitalism.7
By enlarging and protecting the public domain, society would move
towards a more feminine, and therefore more humanist, culture.
The final part of this article discusses the difficult relationship
between traditional communitarianism and feminism. It suggests
that one theory of the public domain may serve as a model for a
more acceptable view of community: the owned public domain where
each person has a right not to be excluded, as contrasted with a
community where individuals are bound by unchosen duties and
lack realistic abilities to exit.
I. LIBERAL FEMINISM: CLOTHING AND FOOD
Liberal feminism, the first wave of modern feminist critique,
accepts the basic liberal concept of humans as entitled to respect
because of their rational nature.8 It argues that women, like men,
are rational humans and should be allowed full formal rights under
the law.9 The liberal feminist political agenda is to counter the
"poverty [that] makes most women unequal to most men."1" Liberal
feminism was, of course, the theory behind the American Civil
Liberty Union's Women's Rights Project, nurtured by now-Associate
7. See ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 8 (1983).
8. Id. at 28.
9. See, e.g., id. at 28-35.
10. Id. at 177.
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg." These pioneers of feminism deserve
respect and thanks for the major legal and social changes they
fomented, changes which have given later feminists the ability to
ask more deconstructive questions. Within the context of intellec-
tual property, the question posed by liberal feminism is whether
United States law denies economic power to women by refusing to
grant property rights in types of works that involve traditional
women's work: food and clothing."
The original exclusion of these works from protection seems tied
to the fantasy hero of early copyright: the author as supersized,
individual genius. 3 This illusionary luminary is triply formed by
patriarchal thinking. First, the hero is the autonomous individual
who creates without support from his cultural network.'4 Second,
the hero is a male in his self-characterization and his claim of
dominion over his children. 5 Third, the hero is male in his elevation
of creation through rational thought over creation through physical
birthing or nurturing during childhood.' 6
Not only has the dominant culture denigrated the giving of
birth, it has also developed a venerated view of what is taken to
be a form of birth-giving: intellectual and artistic creation, and
it has associated this kind of creation with the male. The
capacity to "give birth to" wisdom, knowledge, and art has long
been set beside the mere bodily capacity to give birth to infants.
11. See Morrison Torrey, Thirty Years, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 147, 147-48 (2001);
Biography of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutlbiographies
current.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
12. See generally Malla Pollack, A Rose Is a Rose Is a Rose - But Is a Costume a
Dress? An Alternative Solution in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 41 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S. 1 (1993) (discussing the copyright status of clothing); Malla
Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How to Copyright
a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1991) (discussing the copyright
status of food).
1 13. See, e.g., Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 15, 16 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994) (locating origin of the myth of the heroic author in Edward Young's 1759 work
Conjectures on Original Composition); see also Debora Halbert, Poaching and
Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 111, 113 (Lise
Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (discussing the masculine gender of the mythical
heroic author); Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 77-82 (1994).
14. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FoX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A CRITIQUE
OF INDIVIDUALISM 1-9 (1991) (discussing the patriarchal core of the theory of humans as
autonomous individuals).
15. See Wright, supra note 13, at 77-82.
16. Virginia Held, Birth and Death, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 87, 110-11
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990).
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Not only have such metaphors of creativity suggested that men
also can give birth: they have fixed the association of "male" with
the former and "higher" type of creativity, "female" with mere
propagation of the species.17
Relatedly, the heroic figure claims a high place on the social scale.
The placement of some forms of writing, painting, and sculpture
into the joined categories of "high art" and social respect, as opposed
to mere craft without social respect, was part of the social politics of
Renaissance Europe, not a necessary part of artistic theory.' 8
Preparation of food and fabrication of clothing are traditional
women's work,19 hence primary candidates for both lack of respect
and the low economic support generally provided women's work in
capitalist patriarchal societies.2 ° Chefs were originally classified by
the United States Department of Labor as "domestics."21 They were
not identified as "professionals" until 1976.22 Repeated studies
demonstrate that despite the growing number of hours American
women work outside the home, they still perform the "vast majority
of housework. 23 Of course, women's actual work has changed over
time. With the increase both in relatively inexpensive off-the-rack
clothing and women's out-of-home employment, home-made clothing
is "more often a labor of love than a matter of economic necessity. 24
Similarly, since the 1960s, the United States has seen "a revolution
in the mass preparation of food that is roughly comparable to the
mass production revolution in manufactured goods that happened
a century ago."25 Meal preparation and clean up that once required
17. Id. at 110-11.
18. See WHITNEY CHADWICK, WOMEN, ART, AND SOCIETY 37-42 (2002) (noting that
artistic hierarchy dates from the Renaissance and is tied to the sexual division of labor);
Monroe C. Beardsely, History of Aesthetics, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 18,
24 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972).
19. "Women grow much of the world's food, and everywhere women prepare food for
those they live with." FRENCH, supra note 3, at 483. Despite historical and geographical
variations, "a surprising number of men and women, over time and space, have
organized their activities in recognizably similar ways .... Women have tended to work
in and around households, to feed, and to clothe." Alice Kessler-Harris, Gender and
Work, in WOMEN'S HISTORY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 145, 145-46 (2004).
20. See, e.g., JAGGAR, supra note 7, at 173-85 (discussing chronic underpayment of
work done traditionally by women).
21. See Nancy Backas, The Newest Profession: Culinary Arts Comes of Age in
America, RESTAURANTS & INSTS., Oct. 15, 1986, at 205.
22. Id.
23. NA'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON
THE JOB 16 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartman eds., 1986).
24. A Rags to Riches Tale, LEDGER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston), Winter 2003-04,
at 8-9, available at http://www.bos.frb.orgleducation/ledger/ledger4/winter/winO3O4.pdf.
25. David M. Cutler et al., Why Have Americans Become More Obese?, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 93, 93-94 (2003).
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two hours can now be duplicated in under one.26 These changes,
however, do not negate the sticky social perception of food and
clothing preparation as women's work, nor the fact that the
supermajority of such work is performed by females. The choice not
to protect food and clothing under copyright law is gendered and
anti-feminine.
Although clothing and food are not protectable by copyright in
the United States, they are protectable through utility and design
patents.27 However, such protection differs from copyright in three
very important ways. First, United States copyright ownership vests
on the mere creation of an object, an action technically known as
fixation.28 Although registration is required for some copyright law
suits, registration information is readily obtainable, the fees are
low, and the paperwork can be done by a layperson.2" Patent rights,
in contrast, must be obtained by negotiation with the government,
involve high fees, and require the intermediation of a patent agent.3 °
Patents have a much shorter term than copyrights, but provide
more robust rights.3 For copyrights, but not for patents, independ-
ent creation is a defense to infringement.32 Copyright requires only
a minimal level of creativity, while patents are granted only for
innovations that would not be obvious to a person of ordinary skill
26. See id.
27. Protection through trademark and related doctrines, while also possible, requires
that the res function as an indicia of the origin of the product, not merely as the desired
attribute of the product. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216
(2000) ("We hold that, in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectable,
only upon a showing of secondary meaning," i.e. that it has acquired the ability to serve
as an indicia of origin.); Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[S]ince the primary purpose of Knitwaves' [leaf and squirrel] sweater designs is
aesthetic rather than source-identifying, Knitwaves' sweater designs do not meet the
first requirement of an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act - that they be used as
a mark to identify or distinguish the source.").
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.').
29. See id. § 411; U.S. Copyright Office, Registration, http://www.copyright.gov/
register/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
30. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 32-33 (2005) (regulating persons allowed to practice before the
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)); 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-53 (2005) (regulating issuance
of patents by USPTO); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO FEE SCHEDULE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
31. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-56 (2005) (regulating length of patent term with
standard term set at twenty years), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2005) (regulating length
of copyright term with standard term set at life of the author plus seventy years).
32. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216-17 (2003) (recognizing that patents
provide more power to exclude than do copyrights); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 477-78 (1974) (recognizing that independent creation is a defense to copyright
infringement but not to patent infringement).
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in the relevant art.33 In sum, the availability of utility and design
patents dampens the problem, but copyrights would be a valuable
addition to the economic power of creative chefs and clothing
designers.
The United States' exclusion of needlework from the protection
of copyright law is not as extensive as commonwealth exclusions
reported by Shelly Wright in her groundbreaking feminist indict-
ment of commonwealth copyright law.34 According to Wright, in the
commonwealth system, women's needleworks are protectable as
"works of artistic craftsmanship"; therefore, they are unprotectable
unless meeting some heightened, yet unclear level of artistic merit.3"
She does leave open a slight possibility that factory-created items
may find a warmer home in industrial design law.3" She also
suggests that three-dimensional articles made from patterns might
be considered infringements of the patterns, but the only case she
discusses refused such protection.37
In contrast to commonwealth law, the United States has no
separate industrial design law. The design of works of "artistic
craftsmanship" are protected by copyright as "[p]ictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works," but only "insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned."3 Designs of
"useful articles" are protectable "if, and to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing inde-
pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 3 s Quilt designs,
fabric designs, and lace designs are routinely protected; they need
only the same minimal creativity required of other copyrightable
subject matter.40 The shape of clothing itself is not protected, 41 but
33. Compare Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (holding
that the originality requirement for copyright protection is not stringent and requires
only a "minimal level of creativity") with Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-17
(1966) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 to require non-obviousness for a patent).
34. See Wright, supra note 13, at 90-94.
35. Id. at 91.
36. Id. at 91-94.
37. See id. at 94 (discussing Brigid Foley Ltd. v. Eliott [19821 R.P.C. 433).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (protecting quilt
design); Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (protecting floral pattern on
textiles); Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman, Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970)
(protecting lace design); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(H)(2) (2005) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (asserting that
designs on fabric are copyrightable).
41. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 40, at § 2.08(H)(3) (asserting that the
design of clothing, as opposed to a design on clothing, is not copyrightable).
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certain cases protected uncomfortable aspects of several dress-up
costumes." Three dimensional soft sculptures created by sewing
fabric, including dolls with clothing, are protected by copyright; doll
clothing is also protectable.43 The few cases that discuss making
clothing for humans from two-dimensional, copyright-protected
drawings have held such action not to infringe any copyright in the
drawings.44
Food is less protected than clothing. Food is patterned by
recipes, which are copyrightable literary works.45 In the United
States, however, one may legally reuse a copyright-protected recipe
provided one rewrites the explanatory words.4" The copyright pro-
tection of such a literary work does not extend to "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work,"47 i.e., how to prepare
42. See Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005)
(vacating 12(b)(6) dismissal of complaint alleging copyright infringement of Halloween
costumes and remanding for consideration of whether separable copyrightable elements
exist); Nat'l Theme Prods. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
(protecting some aspects of Rabbit in Hat, Tigress, Magic Dragon, and Pampered Pup
costumes); see also Celebration Intl Inc. v. Chosun Int'l, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D.
Ind. 2002) (refusing preliminary injunction despite probable copyrightable elements of
tiger and giraffe costumes). But see Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 791 F.
Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding multiple costumes uncopyrightable), affd in
relevant part on other grounds, 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
43. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co., 649 F. Supp. 832
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (recognizing copyright protection of dressed, soft cloth dolls); see also
Boyds Collection Ltd. v. Bearington Collection, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 612 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(denying summary judgment to defendant in copyright action on ground that clothing
for dolls and other toys is copyrightable, though clothing for people is not).
44. See Russell v. Trimnfit, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd 568 F.2d 770 (3d
Cir. 1978) (regarding toe socks); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (regarding dresses). In Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416
F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005), a designer of employee uniforms sued on the ground that
clothing constituted derivative works infringing two-dimensional drawings. Id. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the clothing
designs were useful articles without conceptually separable copyrightable elements. Id.
at 422. The court declined to address the derivative work jump from pictures to clothing
because it was "under-theorized" in plaintiffs briefs, adding, "we also note that to find
infringement based on a derivative works right (the artwork itself is protected) would
be to usurp a fairly developed (albeit hotly contested) applied-art jurisprudence that
takes the difference between the drawings and the objects depicted in them into full
consideration." Id. at 415 n.8.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005).
46. Id.
47. Id.; accord Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that copyright in book
describing accounting system does not prevent others from practicing the accounting
system). But see Pollack, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, supra
note 12, at 1476-88 (arguing that food could be protected under the statute by
recognizing an unlisted category, as opposed to considering food items as embodiments
of the recipes).
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the food. The food itself would likely be unprotectable as a useful
item without any separable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural ele-
ments. Of course, if one formed an icing rose, the shape of the rose
would be as protectable as if it had been sculptured in marble.
II. ESSENTIALIST FEMINISM: BODY PARTS
Essentialist feminism, one form of radical feminism, celebrates
the fecundity of motherhood, denying the relative value of disem-
bodied mental creation as typified by the genius author or
inventor.48 This branch of feminism celebrates one patriarchal claim
denied by liberal feminists: that women are closer to nature than
are men.49 In the classic formulation, Gyn/Ecology, Mary Daly urges
women to embark on journeys of self discovery to reclaim their
vitality as mother goddesses.50 Male-created culture is woman's
enemy, the "Male Maze,"' the '"Tower of Babel."52
From the essentialist perspective, the patriarchy inverts
natural order in the treatment of valuable body parts, such as the
cell line at issue in Moore v. Regents of the University of California."
John Moore went to a university hospital for treatment of hairy-cell
leukemia.54 His medical caretakers, however, were also research-
ers.55 Without informing Moore, they harvested parts of his body to
generate a cell line.5" The researchers obtained a multi-claim patent
based on the Moore-generated cell line. 7 The patent was assigned
to the University, which executed a potentially lucrative contract
with a biotechnology corporation.58 Neither profits nor control were
shared with John Moore.59 Moore sued on various claims, including
conversion of his body parts." The California Supreme Court re-
fused to allow Moore either any property interest in the patent or
48. See ANNE CAMPBELL, A MIND OF HER OWN: THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN 30-31 (2002).
49. See, e.g., JAGGAR, supra note 7, at 93-98.
50. See MARY DALY, GYN/EcoLOGY 1-2 (1978) ("All mother goddesses spin and weave
.... This book is about a journey of women becoming .... Breaking through the Male
Maze is both exorcism and ecstacy. It is spinning.... (quotation marks and internal
citation omitted)).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 4.
53. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
54. Id. at 480.
55. Id. at 480-81.
56. Id. at 481-82.
57. Id. at 482.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 480-84.
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any property interest in the cell line descended from his body
parts.6' The court did allow Moore the right to litigate a claim that
the doctors failed to give him full information when requesting his
consent to medical procedures.62 However, the court based this on
the possibility that a doctor's "personal [research and financial]
interests may affect [his] professional judgment [about risks to the
patient]," rather than "because he has a duty to protect his patient's
financial interests" in his own body. 3 The Moore case has no later
reported history. According to Professor Hank Greely of Stanford
University, who has done extensive research on the case, Moore
"received a cash settlement, before deduction of attorneys' fees and
court expenses, that seems likely to have been between $200,000
and $600,000 and a share of [one doctor's] interest in the patent
royalties, which turned out to be worthless."'
Moore is a quintessential case of valorizing mental creation and
devaluing natural physical creation. Under the rules of U.S. patent
law, the cell generator is not an inventor, and therefore not eligible
to obtain a patent because the generator has not mentally conceived
the invention.6" The California Supreme Court did not have the
power to change patent law, but it could have allowed Moore a state
property right in the proceeds of the cell line. It declined to do so.
Like women and the children to whom they give birth, or dying
patients and the organs they can no longer use,66 Moore was held
entitled to donate or not to donate.67 He was confined, however, to
61. Id. at 497.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 485 n.10. The majority did not clarify what Moore would have to show at
trial to succeed on his claim. See id. at 500 (disagreeing with dissent's view that
"defendants will be able to avoid all liability under [informed consent theory] simply by
showing that plaintiff would have proceeded with the surgical removal of his diseased
spleen even if defendants had disclosed their research and commercial interest in his
cells") (Broussard, J., dissenting in part as to the conversion claim and concurring in part
as to the informed consent claim). The standard Judge Broussard rejects is the accepted
rule. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 191 (5th ed. 1984); see also
Moore, 793 P.2d at 519 (recognizing that under California precedent Moore would have
to prove that he personally and a hypothetical reasonable person would have refused to
have the operation) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. Email from Hank Greely to Malla Pollack (May 26, 2005) (on file with author).
65. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 512 ("Neither John Moore nor any other patient whose
cells become the basis for a patentable cell line qualifies as a 'joint inventor' [under
federal patent law] because he or she did not further the development of the product in
any intellectual or conceptual sense.") (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Cynthia M. Ho,
Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?:An Inquiry into the Proper Inventorship of Patient-
Based Discoveries, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 185, 210-11 (2004).
66. See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987) § 10 (allowing donation but not allowing
receipt of "valuable consideration").
67. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489-93.
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the private world of gift.68 Only the mentally valiant inventors (and
their employers) were alloved the option of choosing the male,
public sphere of economic gain.69
The property rights of human donors of body parts used in
commercially valuable research still raise a contentious issue in
academic and professional literature, but no case seems to have
recognized such a right.70 To prevent legal challenges, standard
donation forms sometimes advise donors that they will not be
compensated or that any property rights in the biological material
belongs to the research institution.7' A few states have passed
statutes recognizing property rights in donated genetic infor-
mation. 2 Some research groups have issued ethical statements
calling for sharing of benefits," including one call for a small
percentage of profits to be donated to humanitarian efforts in the
community where the genetic material was collected." Neither
these state statutes nor the ethics statements have yielded any
financial return to the creators of the genetic material. 5
One factually unusual case did result in a somewhat positive
settlement. At the petition of the Greenberg family, Dr. Robert
Matalon began research on a rare, fatal genetic disorder, Canavan
disease.76 Matalon received significant ongoing support from the
Greenbergs, other families of affected children, the Canavan
Foundation, and the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Disease
Association.77 Matalon and his team, working from the Miami
Children's Hospital, located the carrier gene and developed a
screening test.78 The Hospital obtained a patent on the technology.79
In response to royalty demands by the Hospital, the Canavan
68. Id.
69. The body part is market-inalienable with regard to the person growing it, but not
with regard to researchers. See Radin, supra note 4, at 1854 (arguing that market-
inalienability does not "render something inseparable from the person, but rather
specifies that market trading may not be used as a social mechanism of separation" and
noting that "preclusion of sales often coexists with encouragement of gifts").
70. See Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?,
45 JURIMETRIcs J. 153, 157 (2005).
71. See id. at 155-56; see also Daniel S. Strouse, Informed Consent to Genetic
Research on Banked Human Tissues, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 135 (2005) (discussing existing
and proposed models of informed consent).
72. Marchant, supra note 70, at 160.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 159-62.
76. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
77. Id. at 1067.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Foundation terminated its free testing program."0 The two nonprofit
organizations and the families of to genetic donors sued the
Hospital. l While the court dismissed most theories as legally
insufficient, including a claim for conversion, it did allow continued
litigation of unjust enrichment, recognizing that the donated genetic
material might have conferred some compensable benefit on the
Hospital." In other words, this court accepted the importance of the
donated human physical material to the mental creativity of the
researchers.8 3 The case ended with a confidential settlement re-
cognizing the Hospital's patent rights but providing for some
unspecified, royalty-free use of the patented invention.'
Learning from the Canavan disease litigation, a nonprofit
association to help victims of another rare genetic disorder, Pseudo-
xanthoma Elasticum (PXE), contracted with interested researchers
for part ownership of any resulting patents.85 Other groups and
some scholars are arguing for expansion of the PXE model on
various grounds, but none of them seems to have tied the claim to
essentialist feminism."'
III. COMMUNITARIAN FEMINISM: FOLKLORE AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
An attack on the individual as constructed by social contract
theorists is central to many forms of feminism." According to
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1068.
82. Id. at 1068-77 (dismissing all causes of action except unjust enrichment for failure
to state a cause of action on which relief may be granted).
83. See id.; see also Marchant, supra note 70, at 161-63 (providing factual
background).
84. Press Release, Canavan Foundation (Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.
canavanfoundation.orgnews/09-03_miami.php. Plaintiffs did file a Motion and
Memorandum of Law for Reconsideration, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp.
Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2004), 2004 WL 2247051, but
settlement occurred afterward, rendering the motion moot. Telephone Interview by
Malla Pollack with Lori Andrews, Attorney for Plaintiffs and Prof. Chicago-Kent School
of Law (May 31, 2005).
85. See Marchant, supra note 70, at 164 (discussing the contract as a positive
development). But see Ho, supra note 65, at 225-26 (discussing the PXE contract in more
negative terms). The Havasupai Tribe of Arizona recently filed a law suit in Arizona
objecting to the use, for other research purposes, of tissue samples donated for diabetes
research. The causes of action include failure of informed consent but not conversion. See
Lori Andrews, Havasupai Tribe Sues Genetic Researchers, 4 LAW & BIOETHICS REP. 10,
10-11 (2004), available at http://www.louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpl/images/pdf/Lab %20
Report%20win%2004.pdf.
86. See Marchant, supra note 70, at 164-65 (collecting materials).
87. See, e.g., FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 14, at 7; CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT 2 (1988).
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Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "individualism actually perverts the idea
of the socially obligated and personally responsible freedom that
constitutes the only freedom worthy of the name or indeed histori-
cally possible."8 Such refusal to notice the social formation of
persons ignores that all persons are birthed and nurtured inside the
private sphere (usually by women); this tunnel vision leaves the
family, the private sphere to which women traditionally are
relegated, untouched by the political reforms of social contract
theory. As the myth of the social contract is retold by Carole
Pateman: "Civil freedom is a masculine attribute and depends upon
patriarchal right. The sons overturn paternal rule not merely to
gain their liberty but to secure women for themselves.... Contract
is far from being opposed to patriarchy; contract is the means
through which modern patriarchy is constituted."89 Pateman further
writes:
Paternal right is only one, and not the original, dimension of
patriarchal power. A man's power as a father comes after he has
exercised the patriarchal right of a man (a husband) over a
woman (wife). The contract theorists had no wish to challenge
the original patriarchal right in their onslaught on paternal
right. Instead, they incorporated conjugal right into their
theories and, in so doing, transformed the law of male sex-right
into its modern contractual form.... The original contract takes
place after the defeat of the father and creates modern fraternal
patriarchy.'
Even John Rawls's discussion of the hypothetical contract made in
the original position describes the parties as individual heads of
their respective households, i.e. patriarchs who do not recognize
intra-family relationships to be regulated by the justice-requiring
social contract.9 1
This atomization of persons, with society demoted to something
formed by human will (as opposed to humans as beings birthed into
cultures and formed by nurturing), supports the valorization of
88. FoX-GENOVESE, supra note 14, at 7.
89. PATEMAN, supra note 87, at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. JOHN RAwLS, ATHEORYOF JUSTICE 128 (1971) (identifying persons in the original
position as heads of their respective families); see also PATEMAN, supra note 87, at 41-43
(explaining the anti-feminist gendering of Rawls's construct). But see Susan Moller Okin,
Reason and Feeling in ThinkingAbout Justice, 99 ETHICS 229,246 (1989) ('Rawls' theory
is much better interpreted as a theory founded upon the notion of equal concern for
others than as a theory in which 'mutual disinterest' has any significance.").
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'male' mental creativity and the myth of author or inventor as
individual genius.
In U.S. intellectual property law, this recognition of creation
only by autonomous individuals leads to an untheorized need to find
one or more individual authors or inventors for any copyright or
patent right to exist. Copyright vests automatically in the author,
a single human, or in the employer of that human author.92 Indivi-
duals can be joint authors, but they are still authors because of their
individual contributions.9" Patents also require individual human
inventors.94
Since community creation is not legally recognized, folklore and
traditional knowledge are not only uncompensated, but also may be
appropriated by alien individuals. A patent hypothetical is useful to
illustrate this point. Dr. Western visits a tribal society in the
Amazon basin that teaches him its use of the Local Vine, in
combination with sugar and various rituals, for healing wounds. Dr.
Western takes cuttings back to his laboratory and analyzes the
chemical composition of Local Vine. Dr. Western obtains a patent on
(1) the use of sugar in combination with the chemical found within
Local Vine to heal wounds, (2) the process of extracting a strong
version of the chemical from Local Vine, and (3) the extracted
substance. Patent law requires that a patent seeker have himself
invented the subject matter sought to be patented,95 but since the
knowledge taught to Dr. Western did not cover healing by use of
sugar and Local Vine but without ritual, Dr. Western is not barred
from obtaining a patent. Since the teaching was not practiced in the
United States, never written down, and no one has applied for a
patent or inventor's certificate in any country, Dr. Western's patent
is not barred by the other provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102.9 Nor is the
patent barred for lack of nonobviousness, under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
because such non-obviousness is judged only by reference to res
covered by § 102, "prior art," so the possible obviousness of using the
traditional procedure without the ritual does not bar the patent.
97
92. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2005).
93. See id. ('The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.").
94. 35 U.S.C. §§ 115-18 (2005).
95. Id. § 102(f) (2005).
96. See id. § 102(a)-(g).
97. See 25 U.S.C. § 103 (2005). In contrast, earlier oral description bars patent grant
under the European Patent Convention. See Administrative Council of the European
Patent Organisation, Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54, 2 (revised
Oct. 27, 2005) ("[Sltate of the art," the European Patent Convention equivalent of "prior
art," is defined to include "everything made available to the public by means of a written
or oral description, by use or in any other way, before the date of the filing of the
European patent application."). A U.S. utility patent on the use of turmeric to heal
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Under the technicalities of the U.S. patent code, the oral
teachings of the tribe do not exist. The tribal society gets no
remuneration or control.98 Continuing the hypothetical, a member
of the tribe who takes a trip to the United States packs cuttings of
Local Vine in her first aid kit. When she uses that Local Vine with
sugar and the appropriate ritual to treat a wound during her visit,
she infringes Dr. Western's patent. Using the ritual does not protect
her because adding an element is not a defense to patent infringe-
ment.99 Her membership in a tribe that used this process before Dr.
Western's 'invention' is not a defense to infringement in the United
States, though it would be in many other countries. 00
United States copyright protection operates analogously, though
less drastically. Another hypothetical provides helpful illustration.
Dr. Northern visits a tribal society in Africa. She attends the weekly
community gatherings where the tribe's myths are recited. She
records them in her own language and words on paper. Provided she
has not transcribed verbatim, she has a copyright in her work. Since
the recitation has never been written down, Dr. Northern does not
need permission from the community to obtain copyright in her
modifications.' O' Again, the tribal society gets no remuneration or
control. A member of the tribe visits the United States and buys a
copy of Dr. Northern's book, paying copyright royalties. She writes
out a literal translation of Dr. Northern's book into her native
wounds, a folk remedy in India, was cancelled only because written descriptions were
provided to the U.S. Patent Office by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
of India. See Matthais Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, in
INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 49, 77 (Silke van Lewinski ed.,
2004). India has begun construction of a freely accessible online database of traditional
knowledge for the specific purpose of providing legally relevant prior art to prevent grant
of such patents. See Kinjal Mehta, India's Fight Against Biopiracy to Focus on Protecting
Traditional Knowledge, 71 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 251, 251 (2006).
98. Several international groups are discussing proposals to provide control (and
hence remuneration) to indigenous groups by requiring patent applications to indicate
the origin of genetic resources used in the research leading to the patent application and
the existence of informed consent to use of these materials. See generally, Dominic
Keating, Access to Genetic Resources and Equitable Benefit Sharing Through a New
Disclosure Requirement in the Patent System: An Issue in Search of a Forum, 87 J. PAT.
TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC'Y 525 (2005) (arguing that any inequities in use of genetic
material from the developing world should be addressed outside the patent system
because they are in tension with the patent system's goal of inducing technological
advancement).
99. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02(1)(a) & n.ll (2003).
100. Except for business method patents, prior use is not a defense to patent
infringement in the United States, although it is in many other countries. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 273; see also Leistner, supra note 97, at 59 n.63 (reporting that many countries
recognize a general prior use defense to patent infringement).
101. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2005).
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language, the original language of the tales. She has infringed Dr.
Northern's copyright. Dr. Northern's cbpyright, however, does not
prevent the visiting tribal member from writing down the stories
herself provided she either does not consult Dr. Northern's written
version or uses nothing added to the traditional recitals by Dr.
Northern.
Criticism of such exploitation is becoming more common, 0 2 but
the criticisms generally have not been tied to feminist theory.' °3
Many feminists assert, however, that gender subordination is the
archetype of all subordination.0 4 This wide claim should be
understood to include the subordination of indigenous understand-
ings and resources by western intellectual property systems.
IV. HUMANIST FEMINISM: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The preceding feminist critiques are seriously flawed because
they overlook the rampant overprotection of so-called intellectual
property.' 5 Food and clothing should be protected if one takes the
purported logic of United States copyright law seriously.0 6 The
humor inherent in such arguments demonstrates the problems with
the common justifications for expanding protection. Modifying
patent protection downwards while increasing patients' autonomy
rights is more supportable than classifying tissue donors as joint
inventors. Similarly, Michael H. Davis presents persuasive argu-
ments that extending intellectual property rights would not solve
indigenous groups' problems, which are primarily rooted in lack of
1
102. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003); INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Silke van Lewinski ed., 2004).
103. See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media 1-2 (Minnesota Legal
Studies Res. Paper No. 05-12, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=692029
(commenting on paucity of feminist analyses of intellectual property).
104. See, e.g., ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT 65 (1989) (reporting that in the
1970s feminists were asserting that the male/female divide was the paradigm for all
power relationships).
105. The author has presented this argument previously. See generally Malla Pollack,
Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from Constitutional Text to Constitutional
Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 337 (2002); Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern
First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. Copyright and Patent Clause),
45 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2004); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business
Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional
History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61 (2002); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress
Supposed to Promote?: Defining ' Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
106. See generally Pollack, A Rose Is a Rose, supra note 12; Pollack, Intellectual
Property Protection for the Creative Chef, supra note 12.
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economic and political power.' °7 As Davis suggests, cutting back on
intellectual property protection for outsiders is more appropriate.' 8
This article will now address the stronger feminist arguments in
favor of revitalizing the public domain.
The public domain in the United States is ailing. Since 1976,
Congress has massively enlarged private ownership rights.0 9 In
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act with an opinion that unnecessarily sucked most meaning
from its earlier pro-public domain pronouncements." 0 Relying on
that opinion, a federal mid-level review court upheld a statute that
actually restored copyright protection on certain works that had
entered the public domain."' Working to heal the public domain
should be a feminist project.
The public domain is inherently feminist; by enlarging and
protecting the public domain, society would move towards a more
feminine, i.e., a more humanist, culture. The argument takes
several paths, but all reject the Enlightenment-born liberal concept
of humanity, and all converge in one coherent feminist view of
human society. For purposes of these arguments, this article posits
the simplistic definition of the public domain as consisting of those
aspects of culture that someone may use without permission from
or payment to some owner. This article also employs a very broad
definition of humanist feminism that includes any theory looking to
improve society by blending currently under-included female
aspects with the best aspects of the existing male culture.
107. See generally Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About Indigenism, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 815 (2003).
108. See id. at 824 ("IP is a major source of indigenous poverty. Surely, TRIPS [Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] is the biggest disaster faced by the Third
World since the end of the territorial-based colonial era."); accord Leistner, supra note
97, at 113 (quoting Final Statement from the South Pacific Regional Consultation on
Indigenous Peoples Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights (1995)) ("[I]mperialism
is perpetuated through intellectual property rights systems .. !). For more information
on TRIPS, see World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips..e/t.agm0_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998). Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976,
copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until fifty years after the
author's death; under the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), most copyrights now
run from creation until seventy years after the author's death. Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
110. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 194 (2003).
111. See Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(upholding the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 104(a), which restored United States
copyright protection to certain foreign works).
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First, the public domain is feminine because it is not com-
modified. The human of classic liberal theory is a disembodied
individual.112 According to this theory, society is formed by an
agreement among such individuals, a contract.113 Contract is the
paradigmatic social relationship."14 Contract is market exchange." 5
All exchanges are for money or money equivalents. 6 All exchangers
(according to this unrealistic theory) are formally equal in the power
to refuse any particular exchange." 7 Therefore, all contracts are
entered into voluntarily." 8 The ideal of freedom is market alien-
ability with each exchanger maximizing his own self-centered,
personal, idiosyncratic, independently chosen goals." 9 Individual,
alienable, money-exchangeable property is the core requirement of
freedom. 2 ° Money is needed to buy; therefore, money is the prime
motivation of behavior.' Unless something is freely alienable for
money, it will not be produced to the extent desirable. Inventions
and cultural works, therefore, will be created only if their individu-
alist potential authors and inventors are guaranteed the ability to
control their sale. The inability to sell something is counterproduc-
tive.'22 According to this theory, the public domain should not exist
except for minimal corrections necessary to prevent market failure.
Since feminism denies this entire story, the plundering of the public
domain is inherently anti-feminist. The public domain is feminine.
Second, the public domain is feminine because it recognizes the
communal roots of creation. The independent individual of liberal-
ism is not created by his society; he creates his society.'23 Existing
independently, he has the power to create independently. 124 As
112. See, e.g., Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, in SCIENCE,
MORALITY, AND FEMINIST THEORY 111, 111 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielson eds., 1987).
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See, e.g., NANCY C. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX AND POWER: TOWARD FEMINIST
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 39 (1983).
116. See, e.g., id.
117. See, e.g., id. at 42-43, 50.
118. See, e.g., id.
119. See, e.g., Held, supra note 112, at 111-12.
120. See, e.g., HARTSOCK, supra note 115, at 39.
121. See, e.g., id. at 41.
122. Word use illustrates the tie between commodification of cultural works and
patriarchy. Lawyers commonly say that works "fall into the public domain" when their
copyright terms expire, whereas "fallen women" are those who have outraged patriarchal
concepts of proper sexual behavior. The author thanks Laura N. Gasaway for this point.
123. Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the
Community, in FEMINISM & POLITICAL THEORY 143, 143 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1982).
124. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1690).
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Locke argues, each man owns his own body and, therefore, has the
moral right to what his body creates.125 Authors and inventors are
divinities who create from nothing and do not owe free access to
their independent creations to other members of society. To use my
work, you are required to buy it in contract. Feminism, however,
points to the reality that each human develops her individuality
inside some specific society, as part of that society, and subject to
the imprint of that society.126 The author or inventor, therefore, is
not self-created and does not have the power to create from nothing.
Mental 'creation' involves reprocessing communal material. Sharing
with the community, including placing part of 'your' creation in the
public domain, is morally appropriate. The public domain is
feminine.
Third, the public domain is feminine because it instantiates
nurturing. Independent individuals fear each other, as Hobbes has
explicated most clearly. 127 The community they form to contain their
fear is shallow, fragile, and limited to the contracts they choose to
form. 12 Each acts for his own self-interest and has no motive or
need to give away "his" sustenance, "his" property.129 To the con-
trary, his property is part of his defense against the always-invading
others. 3 ° Feminism, however, recognizes a more robust community,
one where the prototypical relationship may be that between mother
and child.' 3 ' Such a community includes love and gifts. "It is the
cardinal difference between gift and commodity exchange that a gift
establishes a feeling-bond between two people, while the sale of a
commodity leaves no necessary connection.' 32 Mothers' response to
their infants' vulnerability is to protect, nurture, love, give, and
nudge the child towards independence, not charge a higher price for
their breast milk. In western society, "gift exchange is a 'female'
commerce and gifts [are] a 'female' property."'33 The free sharing
that constitutes the public domain is, therefore, feminine.
Fourth, the public domain is feminine because it provides
essential nourishment; it is the birthing and lactating mother. As
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 123, at 143-45 (collecting sources on commu-
nitarian aspects of feminism); see also CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 187-210 (1996) (explaining cultural embeddedness of human individuals).
127. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN xiii, 101, 104 (Penguin Books 1950) (1651).
128. Id. at 106-118.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 107.
131. See, e.g., Held, supra note 112, at 114-15.
132. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFr 56 (1983).
133. Id. at 103.
621
622 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 12:603
one seed becomes a plant due to the fecundity of the earth goddess,
so one human sprouts poems due tZ the fecundity of the public
domain, the daemon, the muse."3 4
An essential portion of any artist's labor is not creation so much
as invocation. Part of the work cannot be made, it must be
received; and we cannot have this gift except, perhaps, by
supplication, by courting, by creating within ourselves that
'begging bowl' to which the gift is drawn.... [Tihere are few
artists who have not had this sense that some element of their
work comes to them from a source they do not control.'35
Furthermore, the warmth that is creativity dies if it is not shared,
given back to the outside power through giving forward to an
audience.' The love, gift, nurturing, inherent in living, human-
crafted articles survives as human only if shared freely, at least
partially.3 7 Otherwise, as Marxists recognize, the object is alienated
134. See id. at 53 (discussing the power of the daemon).
135. Id. at 143-44.
136. Regarding the humanity of commodified culture:
The Oklahoma Lingo and Lithograph Co
Of Maine doing business in Delaware Tennessee
Missouri Montana Ohio and Idaho
With a corporate existence distinct from that of the
Secretary Treasurer President Directors or
Majority stockholder being empowered to acquire
As principal agent trustee licensee licensor
Any or all in part or in parts or entire
Etchings impressions engravings engravures prints
Paintings oil-paintings canvases portraits vignettes
Tableaux ceramics relievos insculptures tints
Art-treasures or masterpieces complete or in sets
The Oklahoma Lingo and Lithograph Co
Weeps at a nude by Michael Angelo.
Archibald MacLeish, Corporate Entity, in COLLECTED POEMS 88 (1985).
137. See HYDE, supra note 132, at 151 ("Once an inner gift has been realized, it may
be passed along, communicated to the audience. And sometimes this embodied gift - the
work - can reproduce the gifted state in the audience that receives it."). Hyde also
writes:
The destruction of the spirit of the gift is nothing new or particular to
capitalism. All cultures and all artists have felt the tension between gift
exchange and the market ... how that tension is to be resolved has been a
subject of debate since before Aristotle.
And yet some aspects of the problem are modern. Eros and logos have a
distinctly new relationship in a mass society.... The more we allow such
commodity art [as TV, radio, mass print media] to define and control our
gifts, the less gifted we will become as individuals and as a society. The true
commerce of art is a gift exchange, and where that commerce can proceed
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from its maker and brings only alienation to its consumers.'38 The
public domain is, therefore, feminine.
In terms of humanist feminism's valuing of the public domain,
the United States acceptance of the Berne Convention is a disaster.
It has harmed the public's ability to use commercially nonviable
copyrightable materials by optionalizing the "V' mark.' Not only
is copyright easier for authors to acquire, looking at a work no
longer allows one to discover whether someone claims copyright.
140
Furthermore, an author obtains the full term of possible U.S.
copyright protection without the previously-required filing of
renewal paperwork.
141
Liberal feminism may approve of these changes. Simplifying
legal formalities required to obtain and sustain property interests
helps those who are less likely to abide by formalities, such as
persons of lower education, less sophistication, and reduced access
to legal advice. Such persons presumably include many socially and
economically marginalized women. Although women are as likely to
be artistic as men, they are much less likely to obtain payment for
their art.1
42
on its own terms we shall be heirs to the fruits of gift exchange... to a
creative spirit whose fertility is not exhausted in use ....
Id. at 158. Hyde, however, concluded that art could survive some commodification. See
id. at 274 ("Put generally, within certain limits what has been given us as a gift may be
sold in the marketplace and what has been earned in the marketplace may be given as
gift. Within certain limits, gift wealth may be rationalized and market wealth may be
eroticized."). The question, of course, is where the limits fall. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 119-23 (1983) (recognizing
the problem of preventing money exchange from invading inappropriate spheres, such
as political power); Radin, supra note 4, at 1909-17 (discussing three possible negative
interactions between commodified and non-commodified versions of the "same" res).
138. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 4, at 1871-75.
139. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a),
102 Stat. 2853, 2857 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (2006)).
140. See id.; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris
Act, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341; see also 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000) (making notice
optional); Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004)
(recognizing the practical importance of formalities and suggesting implementation of
an updated formality system). During discussion, Jessica Litman made this point
forcefully at the Duke Public Domain Conference in November 2001. See Webcast
Archive, Phase I: Framing the Issues, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/mpegcast.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
141. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2005). The need to file for renewal was eliminated by
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-1553, §§ 302-304, 90 Stat. 2544,
2572-76 (1976) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2006)).
142. See MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS,
MUSICIANS, AND THE INTERNET 6 (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIPArtists.MusiciansReport.pdf (showing that a disproportionate number of artists
who receive payment for their art are male).
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Liberal and humanist versions of feminism disagree on this
issue. Humanist feminism has the stronger claim because reinvig-
orating the public domain may be an attainable goal and, therefore,
is worth the possible cost to some women. More women presumably
are not, rather than are, authors or inventors. However, feminist
support for the public domain has an additional tension to negotiate:
the partial opposition of feminism with communitarianism.
V. ADAPTING COMMUNITARIANISM TO COHERE WITH FEMINISM: THE
OWNED PUBLIC DOMAIN
Communitarianism, not just feminism, claims the public
domain. The public domain is that which is shared by the commu-
nity, the property held in common. Community, however, may be
incompatible with feminism if feminism requires the flourishing of
women.
Community is not an unqualified good from feminist perspec-
tives. First, historically, societies organized through status over-
whelmingly have given women low status, low power, and low
freedom of choice. Second, theories of community generally focus on
the duties individuals owe to the community.'43 Communitarianism
undermines the autonomy craved by women as well as by men.'
When social relationships are organized through money, i.e.,
market exchange, individuals are less constrained, i.e., they have
more available choices:
Naturally, every obligation is generally resolved through the
personal actions of the human subject, but it makes a great deal
of difference as to whether the rights of the person entitled to
some service extend directly to the person under obligation
himself or simply to the product of [one's] labor or, finally, to the
product in itself - regardless of whether the person under
obligation acquired the product through his own labor or not.145
"On the one hand, money makes possible the plurality of economic
dependencies through its infinite flexibility and divisibility, while
143. See Friedman, supra note 123, at 144-53 (criticizing these aspects of commu-
nitarianism).
144. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 7 (1989) ("The basic value of autonomy is,
however, central to feminism. Feminist theory must retain the value, while rejecting its
liberal incarnation.").
145. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 284 (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby
trans., 1978).
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on the other it is conducive to the removal of the personal element
from human relationships through its indifferent and objective
nature." '146 The liberty that money provides is the ability to choose
how to earn a living and then to take fungible money so earned and
give it to someone so that the other may buy whatever they choose,
including their pick of food items, instead of being required to spend
specific days working on a specific plot of ground and hand deliver-
ing a specified portion of the resulting corn to the person holding a
specified family relationship.
Unfortunately, money economies have not proven supportive of
women either. Money economies tend to deny women adequate labor
choices or labor compensation.'47 They undermine the availability
of the personal support from others which could cushion a lack of
money. Finally, when tied emotionally to a person in need of caring,
women are still likely to give up the 'freedom' of work to stay home
to provide personal care, both because personal care is more loving
and because paid substitutes may be unavailable or unaffordable. 4
Women want power inside social groups and the ability to
choose other communities when uncomfortable within their current
connections.'49 In Elizabeth Anderson's terminology, women want
both voice and exit. 5 ° How can we combine the autonomy gains of
money with the embeddedness gains of community? The public
domain of intellectual non-property theory fuses both and should be
used as a template for other such domains.
A feminist-friendly public domain can be theorized as an owned
public domain where the "ownership" interest each community
member holds is the right not to be excluded.' This insight grows
146. Id. at 297.
147. See, e.g., Int'l Labour Office Geneva, Employment and Training Dep't, The
International Labour Organization and the Promotion of Full, Productive and Freely
Chosen Employment, International Consultation Concerning Follow-up to the World
Summit for Social Development, (Nov. 2-4, 1999), available at http://www-ilo-mirror.
corneU.edu/public/englishlemployment/strat/publ/fwsd.htm ("[Glender inequality is built
into labour market functioning and even into the common view of what is considered
productive work.").
148. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
FORMAL EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 74 (2003) (arguing for "a right of care
givers to give care to dependents without incurring the risk of severe impoverishment
or subordination").
149. See Friedman, supra note 123, at 154-55 (contrasting urban friendship
communities formed voluntarily by idiosyncratic, unconventional, and deviant persons
with the negative pressure commonly placed on such persons by their birth
communities).
150. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
151. Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be
Excluded - or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v.
National Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265, 286-87 (2000).
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from Locke's description of property as something "[t]he nature of
[which] is, that without a Man's [or Woman's] own consent it cannot
be taken from him [or her] ."152 This feminist-friendly public domain
has two elements: first, no individual has a right to exclude other
members of the community from the public domain; second, each
member of the community has a right not to be excluded from use
of the public domain.
This public domain does not have the oppressive features of
duty-driven communities because no one has a duty to add to the
public domain. Of course, certain things on which individuals labor
are placed in the public domain, thus limiting the economic benefits
of authorship and inventorship. However, no one is forced to labor
on such res, while many persons freely would choose to do so.
How do we fill such a public domain? Primarily, we limit what
may be individually owned within so-called intellectual property
law. 5 3 Ending the derivative work right would be one major
improvement.'54 Such a change would mirror the difference between
the mythic patriarch (who seeks to rule children tyrannically) and
the mythic matriarch (who nurtures children towards independent
creation).
CONCLUSION
The public domain is inherently feminine. While some short
term goals are sufficient reason to work within the patriarchal
framework of existing western capitalist society, an invigorated
public domain is not merely a feminist project. Feminists should,
therefore, resist the temptation to call for propertization of clothing,
food, body parts, folklore, and traditional knowledge, even though
the lack of property in these res is gendered. Instead, feminists
should make common-cause with the other supporters of the public
domain.
152. LOCKE, supra note 124, at 395.
153. See supra note 105.
154. See Pollack, Democratic Public Domain, supra note 105, at 35-36.
